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hen Franco Venturi delivered the George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures at 
Cambridge University in 1969, he flirted with the idea of entitling them “Was 
ist Aufklärung?” In the end, he decided against it, explaining that he feared that Kant’s 
famous answer to this question has had the tendency of “leading research away from its 
proper path.”  This diversion, he argued, generally takes the form of a “philosophical 
interpretation” of the Enlightenment that searches for the philosophical origins of those 
ideas that were later put into practice in the popular writings of subsequent 
Enlightenment thinkers.  Venturi maintained that such attempts to bring systematic 
coherence to the often baffling diversity of practical endeavors in which eighteenth-
century advocates of enlightenment were engaged ran counter to the “fundamental 
character of Enlightenment thought,” which he saw as distinguished by a “firm 
determination not to build philosophic systems, the complete distrust of their viability.”1 
The “philosophical interpretation” struck Venturi as deficient, in particular, in its neglect 
of the political dimension of the Enlightenment.  It was this particular aspect that he 
sought to capture in the title that he picked to replace the now discarded “Was ist 
Aufklärung?”: Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. 
Despite these reservations, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment nevertheless 
began with a brief discussion (which reprises Venturi’s earlier essay in Italian on the 
topic) tracing the origins of the phrase Sapere Aude!,  the quotation from Horace that 
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Kant characterized as the “motto of enlightenment.”2 Venturi’s account is not 
without its peculiarities.  First, while granting that the broader German debate on the 
question “What is enlightenment?” might be “interesting,” he displayed little interest in 
it:  he ignored the host of other responses to the question and focused exclusively on 
Kant.  Second, his discussion of Kant’s essay was limited to an examination of previous 
uses of the quotation that Kant took from Horace.  As a result, it had nothing to say about 
the rest of Kant’s essay, which addressed precisely the political concerns that Venturi 
argued had been overlooked by “philosophical interpretations” of the Enlightenment: the 
question of what restrictions a government might place on the rights of its citizens to 
express dissenting ideas and what obligations citizens had as members of organizations 
that require them, as a condition of their discharging their duties, to temper doubts about 
the practices in which they are engaged.3 
Venturi was not alone in focusing on the famous opening paragraph of Kant’s 
answer and neglecting almost everything else in both the essay and the broader debate 
that it joined. While Kant’s response is regularly invoked in histories of the 
Enlightenment, discussions of the essay are often cursory and tend to be plagued by 
nagging errors.  For example, Dorinda Outram opens one of the better brief overviews of 
the Enlightenment by informing her readers that “in 1783 the Berlinische Monatsscrift set 
up a prize competition for the best answer to the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’”4 
But, in fact, there was no such competition:  Outram seems to have confused the prize 
competitions sponsored by the Berlin Academy with the much more modest request for 
clarification about the meaning of “enlightenment” in an article that appeared in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift.   Likewise, Louis Dupré begins The Enlightenment and the 
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Intellectual Foundations of the Modern Age by noting, “In 1783 the writer of the 
article ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ … confessed himself unable to answer the question he had 
raised.”5 But the title of the article that triggered the debate was not “Was ist 
Aufklärung?” (it was instead the much more cumbersome “Is it Advisable Not to Further 
Sanctify the Bonds of Marriage through Religion?”) and its author did not attempt to 
explain what enlightenment was; he challenged others to answer the question for him.6 
Slips like these are, of course, quite minor and it would be pointless to dwell on 
them were it not for the possibility that this lack of attention to the context that gave rise 
to Kant’s famous answer might have broader consequences.  For the failure to understand 
the particular question that Kant was trying to answer typically leads to 
misunderstandings about what he was seeking to accomplish in his reply.  And, because 
his answer has come to serve as a convenient summary of the way in which the 
Enlightenment understood itself, these misunderstandings may prevent us from 
appreciating the differences between the ways in which we see the Enlightenment and the 
way it appeared to those who we take to be participants in it.  What follows seeks (1) to 
clarify, briefly, the particular question that Kant was answering, (2) to examine – using 
Jürgen Habermas’ work as a case in point – the tension between readings that use Kant’s 
answer as a way of discussing the Enlightenment as a discrete historical period and those 
readings that see it as offering a broad outline of an “Enlightenment Project” that 
continues into the present, and (3) to explore how Michel Foucault, in a series of 
discussions of Kant’s response, sketched an approach to Kant’s text that suggests a way 
of reframing Venturi’s distinction between “philosophical” and “political” interpretations 
of the Enlightenment.  
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I. Clarifying the Question 
In December 1783 the Berlinische Monatsschrift published a rejoinder by the 
clergyman and educational reformer Johann Friedrich Zöllner to an article published in 
the journal a few months earlier that questioned whether it was necessary for clergy to 
officiate at marriage ceremonies.7  Zöllner was troubled by the article’s claim that much 
of the population found the presence of clergy at weddings “ridiculous.” Such an attitude, 
he suggested, testified to the corruption of public morals and confusion that had been 
wrought “in the name of enlightenment” in the hearts and minds of the citizenry.  Yet, 
though Zöllner was disturbed by the damage that had been done in the name of 
enlightenment, he did not appear to be entirely certain what “enlightenment” actually 
involved. So he inserted a footnote that asked,  “What is enlightenment?  This question, 
which is almost as important as what is truth, should indeed be answered before one 
begins to enlighten!  And still I have never found it answered?”8 
While Zöllner had reservations about removing clergy from wedding ceremonies, 
he was not at all opposed to the broader aims of the movement that we would 
characterize as “the Enlightenment.” In his own day he made a name for himself with his 
Reader for All Classes, a collection of essays on various disciplines aimed at introducing 
a diverse audience to many of the central ideas associated with the Enlightenment.  He 
was not only a clergyman but also a Freemason and, most importantly, a member of the 
Berlin “Wednesday Society,” a secret society of “Friends of Enlightenment” that was 
closely linked to the Berlinische Monatsschrift.9   On December 17, 1783 — the month 
Zöllner’s request for a definition appeared in the pages of the journal — he joined his 
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fellow members to listen to a lecture by Johann Karl Wilhelm Möhsen, 
Frederick the Great’s personal physician and a scholar with wide-ranging interests in the 
history of science, on the question “What is to be done toward the enlightenment of the 
citizenry?” The lecture presented six points for discussion, the first of which proposed: 
“That it be determined more precisely: What is enlightenment?”10  Zöllner’s footnote 
would appear, then, to be less a testimony to his unfamiliarity with the concept of 
enlightenment than a sign of the intense interest in the question within the influential 
group of civil servants, clergy, and men of letters who made up the Wednesday Society. 
Moses Mendelssohn was also a member of the Wednesday Society and was an 
active participant in the discussions of Möhsen’s lecture that went on within the society 
in the first months of 1784.  In May he presented a lecture to the society on the question 
“What is Enlightenment?” and it is likely that this talk served as the basis for his response 
to Zöllner’s question, which appeared in the September issue of the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, three months before Kant’s better-known response.11  Kant was aware that 
Mendelssohn had responded to the question, but since he could not obtain a copy of the 
issue, he explained in footnote tacked on to the end of his article that we was submitting 
his own response, “as an attempt to see how far agreement in thought can be brought 
about by chance.”12 The peculiar footnote that closed “What is Enlightenment?” would 
have readers believe that, had Kant actually been able to acquire the current issue of the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift, he would not have bothered to submit a response, and did so 
now only as a strange experiment designed to see if his article might repeat the arguments 
of an essay the journal had already published.   
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Recalling this context helps clarify what Zöllner was looking for when he 
posed the question “What is enlightenment?” in the first place.  He was seeking 
clarification about the meaning of a term that had come to be used as a way of denoting a 
group of practices that included, among other things, the proposal in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift urging the removal of clergy from wedding ceremonies.  He was 
requesting that those who saw themselves as engaged in a variety of activities that, in 
differing ways, aimed at improving the society in which they lived step back from their 
efforts and try to explain, more generally, what it was that they were doing. He was 
challenging them, in short, to clarify the broader purposes that these efforts served.  As it 
turned out, the flurry of responses that his footnote prompted offered little agreement on 
how to characterize the more general aims that the term denoted.  In 1790 an article 
reviewing responses to Zöllner’s question catalogued twenty-one different meanings of 
the term and concluded that the word had become so divorced from any clear conventions 
of usage that its discussion had degenerated into “a war of all against all” between 
combatants who marshaled their own idiosyncratic definitions.13 
 Whatever their differences, these responses shared one important feature:  none 
of them took Zöllner to be requesting a characterization of the particular historical period 
in which they were living.  Their intent was to clarify the activities in which they and 
their contemporaries were engaged, not to distinguish their particular historical epoch 
from earlier periods.  There were, not surprisingly, occasional references to the character 
of the present age, but they were never the main focus of the responses.  Kant, for 
example, does consider – in passing –whether his might be “an enlightened age,” and 
responds by observing, “no but it is an age of enlightenment.”14  His use of the indefinite 
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article is telling:  it indicates that while this might be an age of enlightenment, 
his readers could nevertheless find, if they look backwards through history, other ages 
that could make that same claim.  Yet when Kant is invoked today at the start of accounts 
of the Enlightenment there is a tendency to shift the way this passage is understood:  Kant 
is read as attempting to set out the general characteristics of what we now call the Age of 
Enlightenment. 
 
II. Enlightenment as Period, Practice, and Project 
While those who invoke Kant’s answer today may note – if only in passing – that 
there were other answers to the question, any serious consideration of those responses has 
been largely consigned to specialized studies on the German Enlightenment.15  This 
tendency to give pride of place to Kant’s response can be traced back to the end of the 
eighteenth-century:  even at the time when the question of enlightenment was being 
debated, there were already signs that Kant’s answer was emerging as the most important 
response.  
Kant’s growing fame may, in part, account for the impact of the essay.  The 
Critique of Pure Reason had been published three years earlier and had become a center 
of scholarly and, increasingly, popular discussion.  But this alone does not explain why 
his answer trumped the others.  After all, Moses Mendelssohn had an international 
reputation that, at the time, matched that of Kant (his work was known in England and 
France before Kant’s) and his response may have been viewed by the members of the 
Wednesday Society as their public answer to the question that Zöllner (echoing Möhsen) 
had posed.  Personal connections also may have helped:  Kant had produced a number of 
 8 
talented students (e.g., Johann Adam Bergk and Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk) who 
had moved on to academic positions.  By the 1790s they were publishing contributions to 
the debate on the nature of enlightenment and, not surprisingly, their way of approaching 
the question borrowed much from that of their teacher. 16 Finally, while Mendelssohn’s 
essay was deeply indebted to the general viewpoint of the so-called Wolff-Leibniz 
philosophy, Kant’s was – like the bulk of his contributions to the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift – free of technical language.  Though it is possible to trace connections 
from Kant’s essay on enlightenment to certain arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(consider, for instance, Onora O’Neill’s influential account of the role that public reason 
plays in both works17), it is unlikely that anyone at the time or that many in the decades 
that followed would have pursued these links.  This meant that Kant’s response to Zöllner 
was an essay that could be readily understood by readers who knew little about Kant’s 
system as a whole.  Whatever the explanation for its success, Kant’s response has gone 
on to inspire a secondary literature that has pursued two rather different questions:  some 
commentators have used Kant’s essay as a point of departure for attempts to summarize 
the main characteristics of the period, while others have used it as summary of a project 
that, for better or worse, continues into the present. 
To read Kant’s response in the first way turns his attempt to answer a question 
about a process (i.e., “What is enlightenment?”) into a response to a request for a 
characterization of a period  (i.e., “What was the Enlightenment?”). This is what Outram 
and Dupré would appear to be doing when they cite Kant’s answer at the start of their 
discussions and it was this general approach that Venturi hoped to avoid doing when he 
turned away from Kant’s “philosophical interpretation” in order to offer an account of the 
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Enlightenment that focused on political considerations rather than philosophical 
conceptions.   While there are good reasons (as sketched in the previous section) for 
arguing that this was not the question that Kant thought he was answering, those who 
read Kant in this way may not necessarily be condemned to produce the sort of 
“philosophical interpretations” of the Enlightenment that Venturi cautioned against.   
One way of characterizing historical periods is to approach them from the 
standpoint of the general practices that defined them and one of the more striking features 
of Kant’s essay is that it does appear to highlight a feature of eighteenth-century life that 
goes a long way in differentiating it from earlier periods:  the emergence of what Jürgen 
Habermas has termed the “bourgeois public sphere.”18 Like all generalizations about 
historical periods, subsequent studies have found much to criticize in Habermas’ 
account.19 But, despite the shortcomings of Habermas’ study, the now-considerable 
literature on the eighteenth-century public sphere that it sparked only serves to drive 
home the extent to which Kant may well have succeeded in highlighting a significant 
feature of the era in which he was writing.  For one of the things that distinguishes the 
period we call “the Enlightenment” from earlier epochs is the emergence of a new set of 
social institutions – including coffee houses, scientific academies, salons, Masonic 
lodges, reading societies, philanthropic societies, as well as the growth of a reading 
public that provided a market for journals, newspapers and encyclopedias – that would 
play an important role in facilitating the exchange of ideas across an international 
community of readers and writers. 20 For this reason Kant’s response to the question 
“What is enlightenment?” may not, pace Venturi, be the worst of guides to follow in 
approaching the period.21 
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There is, however, a second way in which the question Kant addressed 
has been understood.  It is concerned less with what responses to the question in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift tell us about the eighteenth century than with the implications 
that the broader project in which Kant and his contemporaries were engaged might still 
have for the present.  An example of this approach can be found in a later work by 
Habermas:  his account of “The Project of Enlightenment” in his 1980 Adorno Prize 
lecture.22 Habermas sees the “philosophers of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth 
century” as laying the foundations of a “project of modernity” that is characterized by 
“the relentless development of the objectivating sciences, of the universalistic 
foundations of morality and law, and of autonomous art, all in accord with their own 
immanent logic.” With a nod to his earlier account of the rise of the public sphere, 
Habermas notes that this project also seeks to release “the cognitive potentials 
accumulated in the process from their esoteric high forms” and to “apply them to the 
sphere of praxis, that is, to encourage the rational organization of social relations.”  While 
“partisans of the Enlightenment” such as Condorcet may have entertained the 
“extravagant expectation” that developments in the arts and sciences would lead, not 
simply to an increased control over nature, but would also “further the understanding of 
self and world, the progress of morality, justice in social institutions, and even human 
happiness,” Habermas concedes that “little of this optimism remains” today.  Hence, we 
are left with a choice: “should we continue to hold fast to the intentions of the 
Enlightenment, however fractured they may be, or should we rather relinquish the entire 
project of modernity?”23 
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Habermas’ concern here lies not with an historical period, defined by 
certain problems, institutions, and concerns, but rather with a project that is seen as 
commencing at a particular point in the past and continuing into the present, leaving us 
with a cluster of “intentions” that we, today, may either continue or abandon.  Such an 
approach is not without its pitfalls.  First, unlike Habermas’ earlier account of the rise of 
the “bourgeois public sphere,” any characterization of this sort will be forced to traffic in 
the sort of “philosophical interpretations” of the Enlightenment that Venturi advised 
historians to avoid.  Since there is little reason to think that the diverse practical 
endeavors in which various eighteenth-century advocates of enlightenment were engaged 
are likely to present us with a comprehensive project that we might carry forward, 
invocations of the “Project of Enlightenment” will have to recast these eighteenth-century 
efforts in terms of the broader principles that allegedly informed them.  Such 
reinterpretations, no matter how carefully executed, will inevitably have to screen out 
those concerns that, however significant they might have been for eighteenth-century 
thinkers, cannot easily be viewed as anticipations of the questions we still confront today.   
This is particularly the case when the alleged “Project of Enlightenment” is seen – 
as it is by Habermas – as constitutive of (if not identical with) the so-called “Project of 
Modernity.” 24  Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Habermas maintains that the 
touchstone of modernity is the disintegration of the “substantive” concept of reason (a 
conception that, in pre-modern societies, had been articulated in the form of “religious 
and metaphysical world-views”) into the distinctive “value spheres” of science, morality, 
and art (spheres which adjudicate, respectively, questions of truth, justice, and taste).25  It 
is easy enough to see how Kant’s three critiques can be seen as prefiguring the 
 12 
differentiation of value spheres that Habermas, following Weber, regards as the 
defining feature of modern societies.  But it is considerably more difficult to argue that a 
concern with differentiating judgments of aesthetic taste from judgments about moral 
worth or with enforcing a separation between empirical and normative were central 
concerns of the Enlightenment as a whole.  For example, the intense interest of 
eighteenth-century thinkers in using anthropological accounts of “human nature” to 
inform work in moral philosophy or the tradition of drawing analogies between 
judgments about the beautiful and the good in the tradition of moral philosophy that 
stretches from Shaftesbury, through Hutcheson, and onward to Schiller would appear to 
have little interest in maintaining the clear demarcations between value spheres that 
Habermas finds central to the “Project of Enlightenment.” If the “differentiation of value 
spheres” serves as the touchstone of modernity, it would be equally plausible to argue 
that at least some important Enlightenment projects could be seen as antithetical to the 
“Project of Modernity.”26 
The concession that while some “Enlightenment projects” may have paved the 
way to “modernity,” others did not is, however, not an option that is open to Habermas.  
For, like others who invoke the “Project of the Enlightenment,” he sees this project as 
singular, not plural.27  Having noted that little of Condorcet’s optimism about the inherent 
ability of scientific progress to spur moral and social improvement survives today, 
Habermas goes on to observe, “Even among those philosophers who currently represent 
something of an Enlightenment rearguard, the project of modernity appears curiously 
fragmented,” with different thinkers (e.g., Karl Popper, Paul Lorenzen, Theodor Adorno) 
fastening onto one or another “of the moments into which reason has become 
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differentiated.”28  But to argue that reason has been “fragmented” into a variety 
of contesting projects necessarily presupposes that there had once been a single, coherent 
“Project of Enlightenment” – namely, the project that Habermas identifies with Kant’s 
critical philosophy as interpreted through the lens of Weber’s account of the 
differentiation of value spheres – that has now been fractured.  Yet if this particular 
project is seen as only one of several contesting notions of what enlightenment involved, 
then the alleged “fragmentation” of Enlightenment projects might simply be viewed as 
the continuation of an ongoing set of disputes in which different parties advance different 
understandings of what the activity called “enlightenment” involves.29 
This tendency to suppose that there is a single “Enlightenment project” is, of 
course, hardly unique to Habermas.  In much the same way, critics have tended to fasten 
on one or another alleged representative of this project (the usual suspects include Kant, 
Locke, Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon, and Condorcet), present them as representative of 
“Enlightenment thought” in general, and then go on to find the roots of maladies that 
allegedly persist into the present in the work of this particular thinker. 30  While much of 
this literature has, at best, only a fleeting acquaintance with eighteenth-century thought, 
the questions that it attempts to address are not necessarily insignificant. Despites its 
often staggering failings as an account of eighteenth-century thought, at least some of this 
literature can be seen as continuing to address with problems that are, in at least one 
respect, not unlike the questions with which Zöllner and his colleagues were themselves 
wrestling. For what is ultimately at stake here is the question of what is to count as 
“enlightenment” and what consequences – both positive and negative – are associated 
with differing conceptions of what enlightenment involves. This literature, in other 
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words, is wrestling with the question “What is enlightenment?” – which, of 
course, is a rather different question from “What was the Enlightenment?” 
While these two different ways of understanding the question that Kant was 
answering are analytically distinguishable, they have frequently been intertwined.  Time 
and again, definitions of what the Enlightenment was tend to slide into assessments of the 
various projects it allegedly championed. As Darrin McMahon has shown, some of the 
earliest attempts to characterize the general aims of the philosophes came from their 
Catholic opponents in France, who constructed an image of the movement that saw it as 
much more radical – and considerably more unified – than it actually was.31  Much the 
same can be said for the impact of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s contributions to the so-
called “Pantheism Dispute” on the way in which the Enlightenment came to be viewed in 
German-speaking Europe.  Tracing the roots of the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy back to 
Spinoza, Jacobi invented an enlightenment that was at once radical and irresistible.  
While he intended to raise this specter as a warning, one of the paradoxical consequences 
of his work was that it alerted other, less timid, souls to the radical implications that 
might be drawn from a body of literature that, at the time, seemed anything but radical.32  
Finally, as I have argued in a discussion of the peculiar definition of enlightenment that 
has appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary for well over a century, the history of the 
concept of enlightenment in English has much to do with ideological struggles over the 
role of the alleged conspiracy of “philosophes, Freemasons, and Illuminati” in sparking 
the French Revolution.33 From the start, then, attempts to explain what “the 
Enlightenment” was have been inseparable from hopes and fears about the project it 
allegedly embraced. 
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This same intertwining of definition and critique can be seen in the 
discussions of the relationship between the Enlightenment, modernity, and post-
modernity that Habermas joined in his Adorno lecture.  In his view, attacks on the project 
of modernity had been launched along three fronts.  “Old Conservative” critics of 
modernity – a group that, in his accounting, included such figures as Leo Strauss, Hans 
Jonas, and Robert Spaemann – regard the dissolution of “substantive rationality” with 
suspicion and advocate a “a return to positions prior to modernity,” with differing forms 
of neo-Aristotelianism providing a convenient exit route.34  In contrast, those thinkers 
assembled under the label of “New Conservatives” (a group that, in Habermas’ account, 
included such disparate figures as Carl Schmitt, Gottfried Benn, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein) “welcome the development of modern science” to the extent that it 
promotes “technological advance, capitalist growth and a rational form of 
administration,” but are considerably less enthusiastic about the more culturally explosive 
aspects of modernity.  As a result, they advocate political measures aimed at restraining 
the erosion of traditional values.35 It is, however, precisely these cultural aspects of 
modernity that are embraced by the group of thinkers that Habermas designated with the 
politically charged label “Young Conservatives.”36  Guided by the spirit of Nietzsche, 
such thinkers  
appropriate the fundamental experience of aesthetic modernity, namely the 
revelation of a decentred subjectivity liberated from all the constraints of 
cognition and purposive action, from all the imperatives of labour and use 
value, and with this they break out of the modern world altogether.37 
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This was the tradition that, in France, leads “from Georges Bataille through 
Foucault to Derrida.”38 
Habermas’ survey was, of course, rather schematic and he would later make 
adjustments in his treatment of the group that he assembled under the label “Young 
Conservatives.”39  Nevertheless, his classification is useful in allowing us to see how each 
of the various groups that Habermas saw himself as opposing winds up constructing its 
own particular understanding of what modernity involves and — in the process — pieces 
together its own particular version of the Enlightenment.  Habermas’ “Old 
Conservatives” have tended to see the Enlightenment as inaugurating an erosion of 
traditional understandings of morality and politics that ultimately culminates in nihilism, 
decisionism, and totalitarianism (hence the pride of place occupied in such accounts by 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, who allegedly reveal the fateful consequences of 
the entire “Project of Enlightenment”).40  In contrast, accounts of the Enlightenment 
offered by Habermas’ “New Conservatives” are compelled to separate those aspects of 
the Enlightenment that they endorse (for example, the Scottish Enlightenment, which is 
typically reduced to Adam Smith) from those that they regard as pernicious (namely, 
anything that can be seen as laying the groundwork for the French Revolution – for 
example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau).41  Finally, those thinkers that Habermas gathered 
under the label “Young Conservatives” have tended to create an image of an 
Enlightenment that is defined by a naïve faith in the powers of reason, an uncritical 
enthusiasm for science as the solution to all social problems, and an unshakeable 
attachment to the “grand narratives” of emancipation and legitimation.42   In short, 
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everyone (Habermas included) winds up inventing the Enlightenment their 
account requires. 
 
III. Foucault, Enlightenment, and the “History of Thought” 
In placing Michel Foucault in the company of “Young Conservative” critics of 
modernity, Habermas was simply reiterating (albeit with more pointed political 
implications) what, by the early 1980s, had become the conventional understanding of 
Foucault’s stance towards the Enlightenment: he appeared to be constructing an account 
in which every alleged advance of enlightenment only served to breed new and more 
insidious forms of domination.43  Samuel Tuke and Scipion Pinel entered the eighteenth-
century prisons to separate criminals from the insane — but wound up creating a system 
in which madness was sentenced to “a sort of endless trial, for which the asylum provided 
the police, the prosecutors, the judges, and the executioners.”44 Freud shattered the 
silence surrounding sexuality — only to subject those now freed to the "nearly infinite 
task” of  “telling oneself and an other, as often as possible" anything that might be 
remotely linked to the body and its pleasures.45 And in the most famous of the ironic 
reversals that Foucault traced, Discipline and Punish provides an unforgettable account 
of how prisoners, freed from the darkness of the dungeon, are captured all the more 
securely in the light that floods through Bentham’s Panopticon.46  It was hardly 
surprising, then, that when Foucault invited Habermas to a “private conference” to mark 
the 200th anniversary of Kant’s answer to Zöllner’s question, Habermas understood the 
invitation as “a call to a discussion in which we … would debate various interpretations 
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of modernity, using as a basis for discussion a text that in a certain sense 
initiated the philosophical discourse of modernity.”47 
At the time of the invitation, Habermas was unaware that Foucault had just 
completed a series of lectures at the Collège de France in which Kant’s essay had played 
a prominent role.48 Indeed, during the last decade of his life, Foucault repeatedly invoked 
Kant’s response to Zöllner’s question. The best-known of these discussions appeared in 
the essay published by Paul Rabinow, several months after Foucault’s death, in The 
Foucault Reader under the title “What is Enlightenment?”49 It was preceded by a 
somewhat different discussion of Kant’s essay in an article that appeared in the special 
issue of Magazine littéraire marking the publication of volumes two and three of 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality.50  Both essays were revisions (the latter more directly 
than the former) of portions of the opening lecture of Foucault’s 1983 course at the 
Collège de France on “The Government of Self and Others.”51 Various other reflections 
on Kant’s response can also be found in various lectures, interviews, and occasional 
writings from the last years of Foucault’s life: as he explained at the start of his 1983 
lectures, Kant’s essay had become “something of a blazon, a fetish” for him.52 
Foucault’s earliest sustained consideration of Kant’s essay dates from a 1978 
lecture to the Société française de philosophie, a lecture that offers what is perhaps the 
clearest indication of what it was that led him to reflect on Kant’s response.53  Foucault 
took his point of departure from his ongoing investigations of the arts of governance – a 
research project that spawned a considerable body of writing, most of which would only 
make its way into print posthumously.  The immediate concern of the lecture was with 
the origins of what Foucault termed the “critical attitude” – an attitude that he linked to 
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the question “How not to be governed?”  Surveying the various areas where 
governance had been questioned  – i.e., scriptural critique, juridical controversies, and 
broader concerns about the grounds on which truth claims rest – Foucault drew a parallel 
to the concerns that Kant had raised in his 1784 essay.54  Foucault’s chief concern, 
however, lay less with Kant’s answer to Zöllner’s question than with the changing 
relationship between critique and enlightenment in the nineteenth century.  He saw 
Kant’s discussion as having been taken up by two different traditions of inquiry. Among 
French scholars, the question that Kant was attempting to answer had been pursued by a 
tradition that, beginning with inquiries in the philosophy of science, moved on to raise 
questions of signification, truth, and rationality, which culminated in the question, “How 
is it that rationalization leads to the rage of power.” The German reception of Kant’s 
concerns moved along a somewhat different trajectory, focusing on the relation between 
“the fundamental project of science” and the “forms of domination proper to the form of 
contemporary society.”55 
The history of responses to the question “What is Enlightenment?” that Foucault 
sketched in 1978 tends to confirm Venturi’s misgivings about accounts of the 
Enlightenment that take Kant’s response as their point of departure:  Foucault has nothing 
to say about the political context of debates concerning the nature and advisability of 
enlightenment and, instead, pitches his discussion on the level of the development of 
philosophical and scientific representations. Nevertheless, the sketch does shed 
considerable light on the trajectory of Foucault’s own thought, and this trajectory helps 
account for the significance he saw in Kant’s response to Zöllner’s question. For all of 
their novelty, Foucault’s first works can be seen as products of the French tradition in the 
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history of science that, in the lecture, he saw as culminating in the work of 
Bachelard and Canguilhem.56  His own point of departure, in other words, had been with 
the culmination of the “French” side of reflections on the questions of critique and 
enlightenment.  His subsequent shift in focus from considerations of systems of 
representation to studies of the implications of such systems for the development of 
power relationships (a move that is sometimes summarized as a turn from “archaeology” 
to “genealogy”) led him from the concerns that he saw as dominant on the French side of 
the ledger to those that had been central to the German side.  This shift in his focus may 
help to explain his declaration in the opening lecture of his course on “The Government 
of the Self and Others” (a declaration that would be repeated in the article on Kant’s 
essay published in Magazine Littéraire) that his own work might best be situated in that 
“form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the 
Frankfurt School” had been engaged in attempts to construct “an ontology of ourselves, 
of present reality.”57   
In a short eulogy written in the wake of Foucault’s death, Habermas pondered this 
peculiar declaration of loyalties, questioning how Foucault’s “unyielding critique of 
modernity” could be reconciled with his “self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition 
of the Enlightenment.”  How could Foucault, who traced the ways in which the “will to 
knowledge” was implicated in “modern power formations only to denounce it,” now 
view the project begun by the Enlightenment as “an impulse worthy of preservation and 
in need of renewal”?58 Habermas’ rather puzzled response sparked a flood of articles on 
the so-called “Foucault-Habermas Debate” – a “debate” of a rather strange sort, since one 
of the alleged participants had died before it had begun. This literature focused, for the 
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most part, on the question of whether Foucault’s “totalizing” critique of reason 
deprives his own work of the normative grounding that it requires.59  This particular focus 
is in keeping with Habermas’ conception of the Enlightenment as a period that “marks 
the entrance into a modernity that sees itself condemned to draw on itself for its 
consciousness of self and its norm.”60  But Foucault’s understanding of the Enlightenment 
turns out to have been a good deal different from that of Habermas. 
At first glance, Foucault’s 1984 discussions of Kant’s response would seem to be 
plagued by a number of the familiar misreadings of the essay.  Like others before him, 
Foucault betrays little concern with the origins of the question Kant was answering:  the 
essay published in The Foucault Reader portrays Kant as responding to a question that 
had been posed by the journal’s editors – allegedly in line with an eighteenth century 
custom of questioning “the public on programs that did not yet have solutions.”61 While 
he does note that Mendelssohn also responded to the question, the essay has nothing to 
say about that response beyond the suggestion that it represented an attempt to 
demonstrate that the German enlightenment and the Jewish Haskala were part of the 
same history.62 But, though Mendelssohn’s essay was much indebted to traditions of 
thought that had come to characterize the Berlin Enlightenment, it had rather little to say 
about the particular concerns of the Haskala – when Mendelssohn addressed those 
questions, he wrote in Hebrew, not German.63  Nor is Foucault’s ominous suggestion that, 
in Mendelssohn’s text, we find the Aufklärung and the Haskala, “announcing the 
acceptance of a common destiny – we know to what drama that was to lead” particularly 
useful in understanding the relationship between the contributions of Mendelssohn and 
Kant to the discussion of the question “What is enlightenment?”64 Foucault surrenders 
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here to the tendency to see everything in German history as slouching towards 
the Third Reich, a perspective that is probably not the best angle from which to 
understand Mendelssohn’s text.  If Mendelssohn was concerned with a “common 
destiny,” it had less to do with the relationship of Jews to Germans than with a destiny 
that, borrowing a concept from the enlightened Christian theologian Johann Joachim 
Spalding, he saw as common to all human beings.65 
Foucault’s reading of Kant’s essay is further compromised by the well-known 
passage in which he refuses what he termed “the blackmail of the Enlightenment” – the 
idea that it is necessary to take a stand for or against the Enlightenment – and goes on to 
insist that “we do not break free from this blackmail by introducing ‘dialectical’ nuances 
while seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have been in the 
Enlightenment.”66 Foucault succeeds in evading this “blackmail” only at the price of 
overlooking one of the central issues that was at stake in the debate that Kant’s essay had 
joined.  For Zöllner’s question had been prompted by an interest in distinguishing what 
he saw as the positive consequences of efforts at enlightenment (e.g., the educational and 
ecclesiastical reforms that he championed) from those consequences that he saw as 
considerably more troubling (specifically, the idea that there was something “ridiculous” 
about having clergy at wedding ceremonies).  As Werner Schneiders argued in his classic 
study of the debate, one of the central issues at stake was the concern to distinguish “true 
enlightenment” from “false enlightenment.”67 For this reason, Foucault’s desire to avoid 
the question of what differentiates positive and negative aspects of efforts at 
enlightenment means that he misses what, for Kant and his contemporaries, was the very 
crux of the question. 
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Finally, Foucault quickly narrows his focus to a consideration of the 
way in which Kant’s essay “raised the philosophical question of the present day,” which 
leads Foucault into a discussion of the way in which “philosophical thought”  – from 
Plato to Vico – has “sought to reflect on its present” and to an attempt to see situate 
Kant’s essay in the context of the differing ways in which philosophers have attempted to 
understand the defining features of the epoch in which they live.68  Such a reading runs 
the risk of turning Kant’s effort to explain “what enlightenment is” into an attempt to 
characterize the distinctive features of “the Enlightenment.” And this would appear to be 
how Foucault reads Kant’s essay in his article in Magazine littéraire, which urges its 
readers to  
consider the following fact:  the Aufklärung calls itself Aufklärung.  It is certainly 
a very singular cultural process that became aware of itself by naming itself, by 
situating itself in relation to its own past and future, and by designating the 
operations that it must carry out within its own present. 69  
But those who attempted to answer the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” were not trying to 
craft a name that would capture the essential feature of the epoch in which they lived.  
The question that Kant and others were attempting to answer was “What is 
enlightenment?” (or, as Kant’s first English translator rendered it, “What is 
enlightening?”) not “What is the Enlightenment?”70  
 Yet, despite these misunderstandings, Foucault nevertheless grasped an essential 
feature of what Kant and his contemporaries were doing. While the article that appeared 
in Magazine littéraire (like the opening lecture of his 1983 course) was concerned with 
linking Kant’s discussion of enlightenment to his reflections on history and, ultimately, to 
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his assessment of the significance of the French Revolution, the essay that 
appeared in the Foucault Reader makes a sudden and, at least initially, rather perplexing 
turn:  it examines Baudelaire’s characterization of “modernity.”71 There is nothing in the 
Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France (which, after their opening discussion of 
Kant’s essay, move on to a discussion of the notion of parrhesia in Greek philosophy) 
that corresponds to this turn, which would appear to have been prompted by the series of 
lectures (which began two days after Foucault completed his lectures on the 
“Government of Self and Others”) that Habermas delivered in Paris on the “philosophical 
discourse of modernity” and which included a discussion of Baudelaire’s account of 
modernity.72  With the entry of Baudelaire into Foucault’s discussion, there is a subtle 
shift in how Kant’s essay is approached.  Foucault suggests that Kant should not be seen 
as having offered “an adequate description of Enlightenment,” but instead is best viewed 
as revealing a certain “attitude” towards the present, an attitude that parallels the stance 
towards the present found in Baudelaire. To read Kant’s essay in this way means that 
“enlightenment” can no longer be understood as designating “a world era to which one 
belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an 
accomplishment.”  Professing skepticism towards attempts “to distinguish the ‘modern 
era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern,’” Foucault observes, “Thinking back on 
Kant’s text, I wonder whether we may not envision modernity as an attitude, rather than 
as a period of history.”73 
Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France help to clarify what this attitude 
involves.  During the second hour of his lecture of January 5, 1983, Foucault offered a 
close reading of Kant’s essay, noting that, while the opening paragraph begins by 
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characterizing enlightenment as an ongoing process (i.e., humanity’s exit from 
its “self-incurred tutelage”), it concludes with a shift to a language that “is no longer 
descriptive, but prescriptive.”74  This shift is sealed by the famous phrase that Kant took 
from Horace and designated as the “motto of enlightenment” —  Sapere Aude!  (Dare to 
be wise!).   Enlightenment is now defined both as “an ongoing process” and as “a task 
and an obligation;” it is both “a process in which men participate collectively” and “an 
act of courage to be accomplished personally.”75   
In his essay on Kant’s use of Horace’s dictum, Franco Venturi offered an 
insightful and erudite investigation of a few of the contexts in which this phrase, which 
was ubiquitous in the eighteenth century, had been employed.  He placed particular 
emphasis on a medal containing the phrase that had been cast by the “Société des 
Aléthophiles” — “The Society of the Friends of Truth” – a secret society of churchmen, 
lawyers, and civil servants dedicated to the dissemination of truth in general, and the 
philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff in particular (their images can be seen on the medal, 
peaking out from behind the helmeted head of the goddess Minerva) who met in Berlin in 
the 1730s.  Meeting under the protection of secrecy, the group pledged themselves, in the 
words of their founding statutes, “to seek truth with candor, and to defend it with 
reasonable frankness.”76 Yet Venturi’s tracing of Horace’s motto back to the Aléthophiles 
does not, by itself, say much about the significance that Kant might have attached to it.  
Indeed, discussions of Kant’s essay have tended to view its opening as rhetorically 
effective, but not easily reconciled with the somewhat more cautious parsing of the 
differences between public and private uses of reason that follows. 
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The discussion of the motto in Foucault’s lectures on the “Government 
of Self and Others” seem — at least initially — to be destined for the same fate:  he 
closed his “little epigraph” on Kant by noting that the lectures to follow would deal with 
the relationship between the government of the self and others “on a completely different 
scale, with completely different historical reference points, and completely different 
documents.”77  And, for the most part, his concern in the rest of the course would be with 
drawing connections between the topic of the previous year’s lectures, which had focused 
on the notion of the “care of the self” in Greco-Roman thought, and his ongoing interest 
in tracing practices of “governmentalization,” understood both as the government of 
others and as the government of oneself.78  Central to both discussions was a 
consideration of the notion of parrhesia — “frankness in speaking the truth” — a concept 
that Foucault saw as situated at “the meeting point of the obligation to speak the truth, 
procedures and techniques of governmentality, and the constitution of the relationship to 
self.”79 Yet there are hints that Foucault saw the notion of parrhesia as more relevant for 
the consideration of the question that Kant was answering than it might first appear. 
Towards the close of the lectures, Foucault recalls an encounter between Plato 
and the cynic Diogenes.80  Seeing Diogenes washing his salad, and recalling that 
Dionysius (the Sicilian tyrant who Plato attempted to educate in philosophy) had also 
called upon Diogenes for advice — but had been rejected, Plato is reported to have 
observed, “Had you paid court to Dionysius, you wouldn’t be washing lettuces.” To this 
Diogenes is said to have responded, “If you had washed lettuces, you wouldn’t have paid 
court to Dionysius.”81  For Foucault, this exchange succinctly captures the central polarity 
that has dominated considerations of the relationship between “philosophical truth-telling 
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and political practice”:  the tension between discourses that seek to cultivate, 
and thus improve, the “soul of the Prince” (e.g., Plato’s failed venture in Syracuse) and 
those discourses that, delivered in the public arena, serve as a “challenge, confrontation, 
derision, and criticism” of the conduct of rulers (e.g., the provocations of Diogenes).  It is 
in this context — so apparently remote from that of Kant’s answer to Zöllner — that 
Foucault returns briefly to the discussion of Kant that opened the lectures. 
In his theory of the Aufklärung, Kant … tried to analyze how 
philosophical truth-telling has two sites simultaneously which are not only 
compatible, but call on each other: on the one hand, philosophical truth-
telling has its place in the public; it also has its place in the Prince's soul, if 
he is an enlightened Prince. If you like, there is a sort of Kantian 
eclecticism which tries to hold together what traditionally … was the 
major problem of the relation between philosophy and politics in the 
West: will this relation be established in the public arena, or will it be in 
the Prince's soul?82 
The relevance of Kant’s text for the line of research that Foucault was pursuing in these lectures 
lies in its having addressed a set of concerns “which were traditionally problems of parrēsia in 
antiquity which will re-emerge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which became 
aware of themselves in the Aufklärung.”83  The “motto” Kant took from Horace — and which 
Venturi traced back to those “friends of truth” who pledged themselves to candor and frankness 
in its pursuit and its articulation — captures what is at stake in the practice of parrhesia:  in the 
contest of truth and power, wisdom requires courage. 
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While there is no explicit discussion of parrhesia in the discussion of 
Kant that appears in the Foucault Reader, the questions that Foucault had been pursuing 
in the last years of his life permeate the essay.  For Foucault, Kant’s concern lay with the 
exploration of “how the use of reason can take the public form that it requires, how the 
audacity to know can be exercised in broad daylight, while individuals are obeying as 
scrupulously as possible.”  He found a solution in what Foucault described as the 
“contract of rational despotism with free reason” that Kant offered to Frederick II at the 
close of his response to Zöllner: 
The public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee 
of obedience, on the condition, however that the political principles that 
must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason.84   
The terms of the contract Foucault sees Kant as proposing reiterate the general structure 
of what Foucault describes in the discussion in his lectures of the exchange between 
Pentheus and his servant in Euripides’ Bacchae as the “parrhesic compact.” Like 
Pentheus’s servant, Kant takes the risk of speaking the truth, while at the same time, 
pledging his fidelity.  And, Pentheus’ response parallels the words that Kant put into 
Frederick’s mouth:  “argue as much as you want, about whatever you want, only obey!”  
Pentheus replies as a good, wise sovereign: What concerns me is to know 
the truth and you will not be punished for telling the truth. You can speak; 
you have nothing to fear from me: "one should not be angry with one who 
does his duty." The servant who tells the truth does his duty. Pentheus 
himself guarantees that he will not be punished.85 
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For Foucault, then, Kant’s answer to the question “What is enlightenment?” 
signals the moment when a set of problems that, in antiquity, had been central to 
discussions of the concept of parrhesia, “became aware of themselves” in the present.86 
 In reading Kant’s essay from this perspective, Foucault was offering what he 
termed a “history of thought,” an approach that, as he explained shortly before his death 
in an interview with Paul Rabinow, he saw as distinct from “both the history of ideas (by 
which I mean systems of representation) and from the history of mentalities (by which I 
mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action).”87 His proposed “history of thought” 
would focus on what he termed “problematizations” —those moments when a previously 
“unproblematic field of experience, or set of practices which were accepted without 
question … becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and 
induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions.”88  In 
such contexts, “thought” reveals itself not as something that “inhabits a certain conduct 
and gives it its meaning,” but rather as a capacity that “allows one to step back from this 
way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it 
as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals.”89 
Both Foucault’s peculiar fascination with Kant’s response to Zöllner and the 
continuing importance of that debate itself may well reside here:  for what does the 
debate over the question “What is enlightenment?” offer us if not a prime example of a 
moment when certain modes of thought and action become problematic, forcing those 
who were engaged in these practices to step back and think about what it was that they 
were doing and reflect on how their efforts at enlightenment were implicated in a 
complex “domain of acts, practices, and thoughts, that … pose problems for politics”?90  
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Approached in this way, Kant’s answer to Zöllner, far from being the diversion 
that Venturi took it to be, may well provide a fruitful point of entry into those political 
questions that stand at the center of both the period and the project we have come to 
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